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Abstract 
Existing religious economy models maintain that as religious regulation increases, levels of interreligious 
competition decrease. But new understandings of the market dynamics of religious oligopolies necessitate 
new understandings of religious competitiveness. A relational model of competitiveness using the case of 
evangelical Christianity in Buddhist-majority Sri Lanka is proposed. In Sri Lanka the informal religious 
economy is defined by competitiveness among evangelical Christian groups and, although not recognized 
by the state, is closely regulated. The focus in this article is on the scalar determinations of evangelical 
competitiveness, patterns of secrecy and subterfuge, the formation of strategic extra-group networks that 
enable competitiveness, and outcomes of a relational model. Three insights are offered that can be used as 
a starting point for further work on religious oligopolies, informal economies, and relational 
understandings of religious competition. 
 
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Lily Kong for helpful comments on the first draft of the article, 
and three anonymous reviewers for their comments and recommendations. 
 
Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a Buddhist political elite in Sri Lanka—one that is 
chauvinistic and intolerant of difference, and seeks to contain the spread and influence of minority 
groups. Posing a challenge to the state-protected Buddhist oligopoly,1 evangelical Christianity occupies a 
marginal position in Sri Lanka's religious marketplace. It is subject to formal and informal regulation, and 
to persecution by groups espousing a violently nationalist, anti-Christian agenda. Indeed, the situation in 
Sri Lanka is representative of many other postcolonial nation-states, where “the cause of ‘nationalism’ 
has … turned a religiously plural society into one defined by religious hegemony” (Ammerman 
2010:164). Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that evangelical Christian organizations have grown 
in size and number over the years, attracting converts, planting churches throughout the island, and 
garnering support from communities around the world. Existing theories of religious economy do not 
adequately account for religious competitiveness of this sort; new understandings are therefore needed. 
                                                          
1 Sri Lanka's Theravada Buddhist oligopoly accounts for approximately 68 percent of the population according to 
the Association of Religion Data Archives (www.thearda.com). It is the majority religion, followed by Hinduism (13 
percent), Islam (9.5 percent), and Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant denominations 8.8 percent). 
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A relational model of competitiveness provides a cogent explanation of evangelical Christian growth 
within the restrictive religious marketplace of Sri Lanka; normative understandings of religious economy 
fail to account for such growth. The relational model is based on the observation that in Sri Lanka an 
informal religious economy exists, one that is not formally recognized by the state, yet is closely 
regulated, and is defined by persistent forms of evangelical competitiveness. The relational model of 
competitiveness explores how informal (in this case, evangelical) religious groups remain competitive in 
a more formalized regulatory environment that seeks to restrict, or at least control, interreligious 
competition. In other words, the competitive actions of informal religious groups are relational, and 
designed specifically to subvert more formalized regulatory structures. Indeed, entrepreneurial religious 
groups around the world have become adept at co-existing alongside monolithic encampments of 
religious hegemons, often subverting them for their own competitive gain (see Grim 2009; Miller and 
Yamamori 2007). Yet scholars have given only cursory attention to the competitive resilience and growth 
of groups operating within such contexts, with the case of evangelical Christian growth in Sri Lanka 
being symptomatic of such neglect (see Stirrat 1998:165). Despite Hill and Olson's (2009:631) assertion 
that “unfortunately, it is not very clear what religious competition is,” for the purposes of this article, 
competitiveness is simply taken to be a measure of the ability of evangelical groups to grow numerically 
(in terms of conversion and establishing churches) and to circumvent the regulatory checks that are 
designed to control (often limit) such growth. This is a departure from many existing studies of 
competition within a religious economy framework, which tend to expound the relationship between 
religious competition and levels of participation and commitment among existing believers, rather than 
the recruitment of new ones. 
 
For more than two decades, economic approaches have been developed in order to understand religious 
change. Beyond the West, however, the usefulness of normative approaches is limited by the (supposedly 
universal) presupposition that regulation leads to religious decline, and deregulation to religious vigor. 
Yang's (2006) work on China's religious markets has helped to keep such dichotomous thinking in check 
by asserting that regulation leads to religious complication, rather than decline and demise. Challenging 
the prevailing normative understandings of religious economy in this way yields opportunities to explore 
the market dynamics of religious oligopolies, and to develop new understandings of religious 
competition. Indeed, while oligopolistic marketplaces present the most prevalent state-religion 
relationship globally, they “remain understudied because of the lack of conceptualization” (Yang 
2010:201). By drawing a clear distinction between the “formal” and “informal” religious economies that 
emerge as a result of an oligopolistic marketplace, I develop alternative strains of religious economy 
theorization, while simultaneously contributing to Yang's ongoing conceptualization. In doing so, the 
theory is decentralized, that is, moved from its Western core, to better situate it within different local 
contexts, religious traditions, and systems of power around the world. 
 
In what follows, religious economy theories are considered, paying special attention to the deterministic 
relationship between degrees of religious plurality and competitiveness, and the assumptions contained 
therein. Criticism of normative models underscores the value of understanding oligopoly dynamics. The 
next section introduces the specific case of Sri Lanka's religious marketplace, making distinctions 
between formal and informal religious economies. After justifying the value of qualitative methodological 
approaches to economic theorizing in the third section, a relational model of competitiveness as a 
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grounded theory is presented to account for unpredicted evangelical growth in Sri Lanka. Discussion of 
this model focuses first on the scalar determinations of evangelical competitiveness (i.e., motivations), 
followed by patterns of secrecy and subterfuge, then the formation of strategic extra-group networks that 
enable competitiveness (i.e., actions), and finally, the outcomes of the relational model. Three insights 
that can be used as a starting point for further inquiry are then presented. 
 
Normative Approaches to Religious Economy Theorization 
Situated within the new paradigm of the sociological study of religion (see Warner 1993), religious 
economy perspectives support the demand-side bias of the secularization and relative deprivation theses. 
Such perspectives emphasize the role of religious groups as indicators of religious vitality: vigorous 
religious groups are more competitive than their counterparts, attracting new converts and stronger 
commitment from existing believers. Locating such groups within interrelated systems of competition and 
control, religious economy theorists argue that the (in)efficacy of supply drives religious growth or 
decline, which is in turn determined by the degree to which an economy is regulated and competition 
allowed to flourish (Chesnut 2003; Stark 1985; Stark and Iannaccone 1993; Stark and Finke 2000). Thus, 
regulation and deregulation play fundamental roles in determining market dynamics, as proven by the 
surge in religious activity in North America in the 18th and 19th centuries following the deregulation of 
religion brought about by the First Amendment (Finke 1990; Finke and Stark 1992; Stark and Bainbridge 
1985). Normative understandings of religious economy, therefore, draw a clear distinction between 
deregulated and regulated religious marketplaces, suggesting that the former allows more room for 
interreligious competition than the latter. Put differently, a religious economy is either regulated (and 
monopolistic), or competitive (and pluralistic); it cannot be both. 
 
On the one hand, in a free (i.e., deregulated) market, the presence of multiple religious alternatives 
stimulates supply-side competition, creating a laissez-faire, competition-driven religious economy. The 
Allied occupation of postwar Japan exemplifies this well. Since 1945, the repeal of all laws regulating the 
majority Shinto religion caused kamigami no rasshu awa (the “rush hour of the gods”) and a concomitant 
surge in new Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian denominations (see Finke 1997:48–49). Moreover, Stark 
(1985; see also Stark and Finke 2000) asserts that greater plurality leads to greater competition, which 
results in religious organizations being more vigorous in recruiting and retaining believers. Competition, 
therefore, has two outcomes: greater levels of religiosity (measured as participation among existing 
believers) and more aggressive recruitment of new believers. Note that while the former outcome has 
received adequate study in different empirical contexts (e.g., Fox and Tabory 2008; Hill and Olson 2009; 
Norris and Inglehart 2004; Stolz 2010; Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002), the latter has not (e.g., Gill 
1998; see also Gill 1999). 
 
On the other hand, regulated economies lead to monopolistic marketplaces where competition is 
restricted, beginning with high entry and operating costs for regulated religious groups. Regulation 
restricts competition “by changing the incentives and opportunities for religious producers … and the 
viable options for religious consumers” (Finke 1997:50). Subsidy or suppression are common means of 
regulation, involving, respectively, rewards for “in-groups” and penalties for “out-groups.” Throughout 
much of Western Europe, for example, the preponderance of official state churches (supported by taxes, 
subsidies, and other privileges, and maintaining a cultural monopoly over the nation-state) has led to a 
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widespread decline in individual religiosity and the limited proliferation of religious alternatives (Stark 
and Finke 2000; see also Woodhead 2009). Basically then, because of high entry and operating costs, 
restricted competition, and controlled growth, regulated religions operating within a monopolistic context 
are put at a competitive disadvantage. Regulation suppresses competition, meaning religious 
organizations stand to benefit from seeking monopoly standing, and the state stands to benefit from 
supporting a monopoly (Stark and Bainbridge 1987). 
 
The prevailing assumption that an economy is either regulated (and monopolistic) or competitive (and 
pluralistic)—but not both—has been criticized for being too simplistic. Despite vaunted claims to being a 
“general theory” of religion (or a “theory of everything” according to Bruce 1999:40), its usefulness or 
even relevance is limited in the non-Western, non-Christian (and often postcolonial) world. Normative 
understandings of religious economy have been conceptualized, developed, and debated in the context of 
the modern industrial societies of the West (specifically the United States) that use the Christian tradition 
as a point of academic departure (e.g., Finke and Stark 1992; Froese 2001; Gill 1998; Warner 1997; see 
also Cadge, Levitt, and Smilde 2011). Indeed, Stark and Finke (2000:194; cf. Lu 2008; Yang 2006, 2007) 
unabashedly “ignore economies consisting of nonexclusive [i.e., Buddhist, Hindu] firms.” This brings to 
light the geographical limitations, and exclusive effect, of normative approaches to religious economy 
theorization and, in doing so, calls into question their explanatory potential. Thus, while the economic 
approach is applicable to Sri Lanka, it needs to be adapted or revised to explain with any degree of 
accuracy why evangelical groups remain competitive, despite being heavily regulated. 
 
Oligopoly Dynamics and Sri Lanka's Informal Religious Economy 
 
Moving beyond the binary thinking of normative models of religious economy, Yang (2006, 2007, 2010) 
has recently proposed that four types of state-religion relations exist: pluralism (all religions treated the 
same), oligopoly (one or more religions favored by the state), monopoly (one official religion), and total 
ban (all religions outlawed). Yang asserts that oligopolistic religious economies can be both regulated and 
competitive, thus overcoming the impasse caused by normative understandings. Furthermore, Yang 
proposes a tripartite structuring of religious markets based on his understanding of religion in China: a red 
market of officially sanctioned religions, a black market of officially banned religions, and an ambiguous 
gray market that is composed of religious groups outside those parameters—some that are officially 
sanctioned but engaged in prohibited practices, such as proselyting; other groups not considered religions 
but engaged in spiritual or religious practices, such as yoga, New Age occult, or magic; and yet other 
religious groups—many of them evangelicals—that have not yet been either officially banned or 
sanctioned. Yang's theorizing presents a much-needed break from existing religious economy models, and 
provides a solid conceptual frame for exploring the competitiveness of evangelical groups in Sri Lanka's 
oligopolistic religious marketplace. 
 
The 1978 Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka confers Buddhism the 
“foremost place,” with the state being duty-bound to “protect and foster the Buddha Sasana [the teaching 
of the Buddha]” (Article 9). Nonetheless, every person is accorded “freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice” (Article 10), and “the 
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freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching” (Article 14.1.e). Despite such an 
oligopolistic outlook (i.e., one that privileges Buddhism, yet ensures fairness across all recognized 
religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Catholicism, and “mainline” Protestant denominations), the legal 
structure often does not reflect what takes place at the local level, where invidious assertions of Sinhala-
Buddhist hegemony are common. This is corroborated by a range of indexes from the U.S. State 
Department's International Religious Freedom2 reports (2003–2010) for Sri Lanka, with Government 
Regulation of Religion scoring 6/10, Social Regulation of Religion 9.4/10, and Religious Persecution 
9/10 (where 10 is the highest rate of regulation/persecution). As suggested by these indexes, civil society 
is more assertive in regulating religious groups than the government, and minority religious groups are 
highly persecuted. This dynamic plays a central role in the development of the relational model of 
competitiveness, as animosity is often exacerbated by the competitive actions of evangelical groups (see 
subsection D below). That said, the mobilization of civil society against religious minorities gained 
momentum during the period of European colonization in particular. 
 
Throughout the country's modern history, a number of influential Buddhist leaders3 have gained 
prominence for imbuing political rhetoric with exclusivist religious and ethnic sentiment. Such sentiment 
reflects what Ammerman (2010:155) terms the “narrative of loss,” defined as a “loss of privilege, loss of 
authority, perhaps loss of vitality and influence” in the face of religious plurality and, in this case, colonial 
rule. The ensuing mobilization of communities against “foreign” elements that are seen to threaten their 
traditional society and culture, and limit the realization of a Bauddha Rajya (“Buddhist state”), has 
resulted in attempts to suppress the growth and autonomy of minorities by increasingly punitive means 
(see Bartholomeusz and de Silva 1998; Deegalle 2006; Obeyesekere 1995; Tambiah 1986). In spite (or, 
perhaps, because) of such hostility, evangelical Christian groups4 have gained notoriety in recent decades. 
Since the 1980s, a “rapid and relatively large influx of new Christian denominations”5 (Perera 1998:1) is 
alleged to have entered the country, compounded in more recent years by the arrival of “Christian 
missionary organizations … surreptitiously under the camouflage of new business ventures” (Tilakaratne 
2006:222). While correctly reflecting the trend of Christian growth in recent decades, the view that such 
growth is solely a result of “influxes” and “missionary organizations” (a foreign invasion of the 
neocolonizing West; see Matthews 2007) grossly underestimates the competitive zeal of domestic players 
who have become effective at overcoming the restrictions imposed on them. Competitive gain is not, I 
argue, a function of superior funding and overseas support alone (although I do not discount these 
factors), but instead is due to the relational actions of Christian groups in generating competitive 
outcomes (e.g., evangelical interaction, conversion) where they may otherwise have been restricted. 
                                                          
2 http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/country_210_1.asp 
3 Notable Buddhist reformists include Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933), Gangodawila Soma Thero (1948–2003), 
and most recently the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)—an ultra-nationalist Buddhist political party that was elected to 
parliament in 2004. 
4 The label “evangelical” is something of a misnomer as it can be applied to any Christian church. In Sri Lanka, a 
clear-cut distinction exists between mainline and nonmainline churches; while the “evangelical” label primarily 
speaks to the latter category, it does not exclude the former. 
5 Numerical data to substantiate the claim of evangelical Christian growth are lacking. At the country level, census 
data were collected in 1981 and 2001, although the 2001 census omitted seven out of a total 25 districts in the north 
and east of the island due to the civil war. In the district with the largest Protestant Christian population, Colombo, 
there has been an increase in real terms of 10,736 (or 26.4 percent) between 1981 and 2001. 
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According to Yang's (2006) tripartite market structure, in Sri Lanka, the “red” market would comprise 
those religions that are officially recognized at the ministerial level: Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamic groups, 
the Catholic Church, and “mainline” Protestant denominations.6 The place of evangelical groups 
(commonly identified as “free” or Pentecostal churches) is not so easily defined; they are not represented 
by, nor accountable to, the Ministry of Christian Affairs, which sanctions the Roman Catholic and 
mainline Protestant denominations only. Their position within Sri Lanka's religious economy is unclear; 
because they are not formally recognized at the ministerial level, they are neither legal nor illegal, but 
rather politically taboo (i.e., they have no legal status). Indeed, the recognition that comes with being 
either a “legal” or “illegal” religious group suggests a degree of formality in the religious economy: 
groups operate and are categorized, labeled, and treated in accordance with their legal position. Problems 
arise when nonlegal groups, or those with no legal status, are included within religious economy 
theorizations, as they are not subject to the same regulatory controls as those that are legally recognized. 
Moreover, because religious groups are not required to register with the government in Sri Lanka, many 
evangelical groups are registered under the Companies Act (unlike the Catholic, Anglican, and other 
mainline churches, for example, which have long been incorporated under acts of parliament), further 
obfuscating their religious, and political, position (see U.S. Department of State 2010). Thus, while Yang 
differentiates between the red, black, and gray markets, he ultimately conceptualizes them as part of the 
same economic system that recognizes all religious groups, whether legal or illegal, or in red, gray, or 
black markets. Delineating the religious economy along these lines is misleading in the Sri Lankan 
context, where evangelical groups are unrecognized and therefore create their own informal religious 
economy that exists in parallel with the formal economic system of state-sanctioned religions. The 
relationship between the two systems is replete with tension, and is not addressed by existing studies. 
 
In addition, Yang treats the state as the sole regulatory body. However, civil society is largely controlled 
by the Buddhist hierarchy, which has enormous influence over the state and state apparatus at the local 
level in Sri Lanka. The regulatory effect of such “religious cartels” (Grim and Finke 2011:8) is often 
overlooked, mistakenly so, given their role in blurring the boundary between what constitutes “legal” and 
“illegal” religious activity in practice and in law. Distinguishing between “formal” and “informal” 
religious economies, therefore, presupposes a more relativized, accurate view of regulation that goes 
beyond the legal power(lessness) of the state and takes into consideration the regulatory actions of 
nonstate actors as well. By disrupting the systems of positive feedback between regulation and 
competition, Sri Lanka's informal economy challenges a core premise of more formal religious economy 
theorizations; in doing so, it calls for a new view of competitiveness. The fact that evangelical groups are 
notoriously discreet, difficult to control, and pose a “constant challenge to regulators and researchers” 
(Yang 2010:202) does not diminish our need to understand how they operate within the informal religious 
economy; rather, it increases it. 
 
Methodology 
Qualitative data were collected throughout 2010–2011 for a wide-ranging project on the politics of 
evangelical Christian growth in Sri Lanka. I personally conducted 106 in-depth interviews in seven 
                                                          
6 “Mainline” denominations are Anglican, Baptist, Christian Reformed, Methodist, Presbyterian, the Salvation 
Army, and the Church of South India. See www.christian.gov.lk. 
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locations across the island with a variety of stakeholders, including pastors of both evangelical and 
mainline churches, parachurches, Christian NGOs, representatives of Buddhist and Hindu organizations, 
and government bodies. The vast majority of interviews were in English. Those that were conducted in 
Sinhala/Tamil were done so with the help of a translator, who was selected by the respondent to ensure 
confidentiality and to minimize the censoring of comments. Nearly all interviews were with “elites” or 
“leaders” (i.e., those who play an instructive role in organizational decision making) who were 
responsible for formulating and implementing strategies of evangelism, or, contrariwise, for imposing 
regulations or restrictions on evangelical groups. 
 
Given the informal presence and operation of many evangelical groups, the majority of respondents were 
recruited via snowball sampling, which developed along the lines of preexisting evangelical networks. 
Colombo is the primary nodal point of evangelical networks at the national (and international) scale, with 
provincial centers such as Galle (Southern Province), Kandy (Central), Vavuniya (Northern), and 
Trincomalee (Eastern) comprising some of the secondary nodes. Secondary nodes were chosen to ensure 
the sample was geographically spread across Sri Lanka, and that they captured a range of locational 
nuances: from the Buddhist strongholds of Kandy and the south (which was also badly affected by the 
2004 Asian tsunami), to the postwar reconstruction of the north and east, and to the country's locus of 
modernity—Colombo. The first four weeks of fieldwork were spent in Colombo, cold calling evangelical 
organizations (located via local evangelical literature and websites, telephone directories, and Internet 
searches) and gaining access to key contacts in the secondary nodes. Working down the sampling 
hierarchy (i.e., from the primary node of Colombo, to the secondary provincial nodes, to rural villages) 
reflects a form of “theoretical sampling” (Glaser and Strauss 1967) whereby ideas formed in the primary 
and secondary nodes could then be tested in the rural villages, which are typically governed by primordial 
structures of Buddhist power, and so exhibit more nuanced (and, therefore, relational) expressions of 
evangelical Christian competitiveness. All interviews were recorded (with consent), fully transcribed, and 
coded as soon as possible after completing fieldwork. 
 
The deviation from new paradigm emphases on “congregational studies” (Woodhead 2009) is intentional, 
and necessary, given the sensitivity surrounding evangelical Christian groups in Sri Lanka, and the need 
to understand the motivations and behavior of those responsible for implementing organizational growth 
strategies. To treat the opinions and identities of the research participants with utmost confidentiality 
(which is important given the persecution such individuals have experienced, and the often illicit nature of 
competition), the interview data are presented here with caution and a healthy degree of abstraction. All 
names (even pseudonyms) of individuals and organizations, and specific locational identifiers have been 
omitted; what remains is an indication of the type of organization the respondent represents, and a 
location identifier at the provincial level. Quotations included in the article were selected based on how 
representative they are of the broader sample, and on clarity of expression. For key arguments, I have 
included two or more quotations as an indicator of interrespondent reliability. 
 
A wholly qualitative approach presents a significant departure from normative substantiations of religious 
economy, which tend to be deductive and based on large-scale datasets derived from censuses and 
surveys. In defense of a qualitative approach, note that the methodological and theoretical exclusivity 
upon which normative theories of religious economy are grounded have been strongly criticized for 
ignoring the value of qualitative understandings of religion derived from induction, narratives, and 
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ethnography (see Ammerman 1997; Bruce 1999; Neitz and Mueser 1997). Interestingly, attempts to 
integrate quantitative (often econometric) analyses with more qualitative inputs are emerging and deserve 
recognition (e.g., Iyer et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the generation and usage of large-scale datasets in 
countries like Sri Lanka is inherently problematic anyway, not least because of the unwillingness of 
evangelical groups to accurately report numerical measures of competitiveness (i.e., growth) to the 
relevant authorities (see subsection B below). Given the need to understand the complexities and 
subtleties of Sri Lanka's informal religious economy, the divergent methodological approach I have 
employed is therefore warranted. 
 
The data were used to develop a grounded theory of evangelical Christian competitiveness in Sri Lanka, 
the product of which is the relational model of competitiveness. Offering an explanation of how 
regulation and competition co-exist, the model is not limited to the geographical confines of Sri Lanka's 
religious marketplace. Instead, it can be applied and developed in other oligopolistic marketplaces, and 
can be especially relevant when explaining the proliferation of informal, and unclassified, new religious 
movements around the world. In particular, the “10/40 Window”—a belt of territory that spans the 
territories 10 to 40 degrees north, spanning Northern Africa, the Middle East, and much of Asia—
contains a number of oligopolistic marketplaces that, like Sri Lanka, attempt to regulate and restrict the 
competitive actions of evangelical groups. Paradoxically, the 10/40 Window is simultaneously viewed by 
evangelical groups as “spiritually impoverished” (Stump 2000:224) and as one of the most attractive sites 
of evangelical activity in the world (see Gerhardt 2008:917–19). The 10/40 Window therefore presents 
especially relevant sites of empirical comparison to which the relational model of evangelical 
competitiveness can be applied, tested, and developed further. 
 
A Relational Model of Competitiveness 
Normative understandings of competitiveness in a religious economy assume a high degree of 
synchronicity between the regulators (the monopoly) and the regulated (the minorities). Monopolies make 
it difficult for competitors to compete, so they stop competing with the same degree of voracity. Actually, 
clear-cut causal relationships like this are rare, especially in the oligopolistic marketplace. Instead, I argue 
that a relational model of competitiveness will explain how groups vary the type of competitive strategies 
they employ to overcome restrictions on growth. More specifically, I suggest that as regulation increases, 
minority players operate in increasingly covert (or informal) ways. Such a dynamic is evident throughout 
Sri Lanka; areas of strong Christian opposition precipitate a shift toward secrecy, wherein evangelical 
groups continue to work, albeit “very quietly” (Evangelical Church, Central Province), also referred to in 
one area as “the silent work” (Evangelical Parachurch, Northern). Conversely, deregulation results in 
more overt—and therefore visible and measurable—forms of interreligious competition. Accordingly, 
rather than regulation determining the outcomes of competition, I argue that regulation determines the 
methods employed by minority groups to promote competition, despite a regulatory environment that 
seeks to restrict autonomous action. Put differently, the model explains how evangelical groups remain 
competitive despite being embedded within punitive structures of power, regulation, and control. 
 
Beyond religious economy theorizations, existing information about the competitiveness of evangelical 
groups tends to be descriptive and divorced from the socioreligious structures in which the groups are 
embedded. For example, Gerlach and Hine's (1968) seminal paper on Pentecostal growth in Latin 
 9 
 
 
America shows how the cellular, amorphous structure and operations of such groups enable them to adapt 
and grow within a wide range of cultural contexts—or “ecological niches”—and make regulation and 
suppression difficult. Characteristics like these, which by now are widely accepted as catalysts of growth, 
do, however, take on different forms and meanings in different religious contexts. Martin's (2002:154, 
156) recognition that such groups are “freewheeling religious entrepreneurs” that often employ 
“ingeniously pragmatic” ways of circumnavigating regulatory frameworks to engage with society 
provides a more relational perspective, but we can go further to show how competitive strategies are 
formed in response to the structural forces meant to inhibit growth. Evangelical vigor is not diminished or 
nullified in any way, but merely takes on different forms that are sensitive to, and therefore reflective of, 
the broader workings of the religious economy. 
 
The motivations that drive competitive action in Sri Lanka are described in the four subsections below, 
followed by an examination of two unique characteristics of evangelical groups that are looking to 
consolidate and improve their market share under oligopolistic conditions. 
 
A. Scalar Determinations and Dissident Geopolitics 
First, it is necessary to examine the scalar determinations of evangelical groups. Doing so will bring to 
light the motivations that exacerbate the asynchronous relationship between regulators (Buddhist) and 
regulated (Christian) in Sri Lanka. Evangelical Christian groups are defined by the resolutely geopolitical 
ambition to “make disciples of all nations.”7 In doing so, they practice what Bryant and Lamb (1999:8) 
term the “ideology of mission” whereby religious domination (expressed in terms of “salvation”) is the 
ultimate goal. Ideologically, they transcend the boundaries imposed by the state and enforced by 
indigenous religious groups, as they actively seek to baptize people into a trans-ethnic, trans-territorial 
faith community. Espousing a higher level of authorization, a divine mandate from Christ validates 
Christian claims to local religious markets, and challenges the regulatory controls that seek to contain 
their growth. In Turkey, West (2006:280) has shown how Islamic social and political movements do not 
“oppose the actions of any particular state,” but instead subordinate the state “to a functional role within a 
transcendental order defined by a religious faith.” Referred to as “dissident geopolitics,” the actions of 
evangelical groups are similarly driven by transcendental motives that, where necessary, ignore the state, 
religious hegemons, and the territorial sovereignty claimed by each. 
 
Dissident geopolitics is grounded in action at the microscale. Sri Lanka's evangelical community relies on 
a transcendental order (or, as one mainline pastor put it: “They claim a monopoly of truth.”) to validate its 
marginal position in society. This belief governs how it competes, and remains motivated to compete, on 
a day-to-day basis: “We don't think that power is in the majority; we believe power is in God” 
(Evangelical Church, Northern). Blinkered views of power like this undermine regulatory controls 
seeking to curtail the freedom of evangelical groups. One such control, not yet enforced but being debated 
in parliament since 2004, is the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill. Providing a legislative solution to 
the problem of unchecked religious proselyting, the Bill, if passed, will criminalize conversion by 
“unethical” means (i.e., by the use of force, fraud, or allurement; see Owens 2007). Arising out of the 
                                                          
7 These are the words of the resurrected Jesus Christ to his disciples; known as the Great Commission, it is a central 
Christian tenet and key justification for mission work and evangelism. 
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belligerent proselyting strategies practiced by some groups in recent years (notably in the aftermath of the 
2004 tsunami; see Matthews 2007), it provides a good example of how religious hegemons “harness the 
power of the State to impose sanctions on religious expression that does not fall within that institution's 
definition of orthodoxy” (Ammerman 2010:161). Such legislation symbolizes the move to further restrict 
the freedom of minorities (specifically Christian) to proselytize, irrespective of whether they engage in 
activity that is “unethical” or not. 
 
Evangelical opinions of the Bill highlight the strong belief that the law of the Bible transcends that of the 
state. An exchange with a pastor of a mainline church in Colombo exposes the tension between secular 
and biblical law well: 
Until lately I was very worried about this [the Bill], and, oh my goodness, what's going to 
happen? But, you know, if I believe in the sovereignty of God and if I believe in a living God 
who is Almighty, I mean, what is this? Big, big, big nonsense. … I believe in a God that is much 
greater than our [humanity's] puny efforts to stifle opposition. 
If it is passed, will it affect what you do? 
Yes. 
Will you change? 
I won't change what I’m doing. 
Even if that means being punished by the law? 
Yes. 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed across all churches and geographies. Measures like the Bill are perceived 
as discrimination against the actions of evangelical groups and result in the reframing of domestic matters 
within a broader, biblical schema, enshrining defiance to an unjust state, and an unjust law: “The law is 
against the Bible; I am ruled by a higher law in that sense” (Evangelical Church, Western). “We are not 
worried about these phrases called ‘unethical conversion.’ We are here to convert and we will do it. That 
[Bill] will not deter us” (Evangelical Parachurch, Southern). Thus transcendental motivations, facing 
obstacles, encourage more relativized interpretations of civil law. As one Buddhist respondent accurately 
observed, evangelical Christians have “become a law unto themselves” (Buddhist Organization, Western), 
while a mainline pastor bemoaned the fact that “a lot of people think they’re above civil law because they 
believe in the Bible, and that's a load of rubbish” (Mainline Church, Western). Such dissident 
interpretations elicit negative (often violent) responses from anti-Christian groups, even as they also 
emphasize the fact that evangelical groups would rather face violent recriminations than compromise their 
biblical rights. 
 
While the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill remains in debate, the razing of churches by anti-
Christian groups poses a more immediate and real problem. Since places of religion hold a sanctified and 
highly symbolic position in Sri Lankan culture, these attacks hold a significance that extends beyond the 
church building itself; they represent an ideological assault on the spatial encroachment of marginal 
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groups into the domain of the dominant, state-sanctioned religious order. Such meaning, however, is lost 
on evangelical groups, whose dissidence stems from an alternate concept of religious place: “For us, a 
church cannot be burned down or broken down by human hands because [a church is] people gathered 
together and not buildings; buildings don't mean a thing” (Evangelical Parachurch, Western). Here, as in 
the examples above, the dismissive references to the regulatory power of humans (“our puny efforts to 
stifle opposition” and “broken down by human hands”) belittle both unlawful violence and the law's 
regulations by reframing them within the Christian transcendental mandate. Not only does the 
transcendental order legitimize acts of defiance against Buddhist antagonism, but it also stimulates a drive 
to realize Christianity's geopolitical vision, irrespective of the consequences. 
 
B. Patterns of Secrecy and Subterfuge 
A core proposition of the relational model of competitiveness is that, in a context where a minority group 
faces repression, it will remain competitive by employing methods that enable it to act in increasingly 
covert ways. Such actions can be subdivided into those defined by secrecy (i.e., being intentionally 
discreet) and subterfuge (i.e., being intentionally misleading). Past studies speak of religion and secrecy in 
terms of information (e.g., Barkun 2006; Bok 1989), whereas the focus here is on action. In practice, 
secrecy and subterfuge tend to overlap since most actions contain elements of both; hence, they need to be 
examined in tandem. Three areas in particular highlight these patterns of deceit well: the presence and 
diffusion of evangelical churches, the identity and mobility of evangelical Christian clergy, and the 
mobilization and deployment of the laity. 
 
First, the religious infrastructure of the evangelical movement—that is, the churches that act as a central 
gathering place for congregations—is overwhelmingly inconspicuous. Houses are commonly used to hold 
worship services. In a country where religious buildings are easily identified and respected, the “house 
church” removes any outward signs of evangelical competitiveness: Buddhists “cannot piece us together 
because we don't have visible buildings; the church architecture is not there” (Evangelical Church, 
Western). Although the practice of using house churches is biblically justified according to the New 
Testament bias of evangelical groups, meeting there also serves an eminently practical purpose by 
“tend[ing] to go more under the radar in the sense that they operate in that gray area” (Evangelical 
Church, Southern). The “gray area” of the house church is replete with tension, yet remains a source of 
competitive strength and growth for evangelical groups: “You can actually be more aggressive in entering 
into a non-Christian area when you go into a house. … It's a very low cost crusade; and you can do it 
every week” (Evangelical Church, Western). Given that formal approval for the construction of church 
buildings is costly and difficult to obtain, the use of the private domain of a home is a competitive 
response to the restrictions imposed upon evangelical groups. 
 
Second, like the house churches, a distinguishing feature of evangelical clergy is their nondescript 
appearance, which stands in contrast to their religious counterparts. Religious dress, and conformity in 
dress, is highly regarded in Sri Lanka. By contrast, the vast majority of evangelical pastors eschew the 
cassock, collar, or any other such identifiers because it would attract attention, making their actions more 
visible and therefore more likely to be an obstacle to proselyting: “If you identify yourself as a clergyman, 
then the clergyman becomes isolated; people will treat him with respect, but they will keep a distance 
from him” (Evangelical Church, Western). This effect is more pronounced in rural areas, as one pastor 
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explained: “People would never sit and eat with me because I’m a pastor. … You see they have this 
clergy, they have this religious hierarchical mentality, it comes from Buddhism … where you honor the 
robe more than the person” (Evangelical Church, Southern). Power distancing (or a “religious hierarchical 
mentality”) poses a problem for evangelists looking to build strong social bonds with people as part of the 
process of conversion. Religious dress not only elevates pastors above the people they are trying to 
ingratiate themselves with, but it also allows for easy surveillance by non-Christian groups. For churches 
to be planted and grow in rural villages (in particular), dress becomes a strategy of subterfuge that 
removes any visible trace of the encroachment of minority groups: 
 
There are a lot of villages that Buddhist monk has told that they will not allow any [Christian] 
pastor to come into this village. So if I go with a cassock or collar, definitely the news will go 
very quickly to that Buddhist monk that pastor has come to the village; so it's very difficult for 
me to go and serve there. So normally when I go to that village I remove the board of the church 
from the man, and I just go casually and have prayer meetings. (Mainline Church, Western) 
 
The need to “remove” the physical trappings of Christianity is in contrast to evangelical pastors, whose 
dissident style is dictated by the rejection of Old Testament principles of religious dress. Indeed, most 
evangelical pastors choose not to dress in a way that reveals their religious identity or position to society; 
a choice that contrasts with the high visibility of monks and other religious leaders in Sri Lanka. Adopting 
a less defined religious identity does not stop with the clergy. Converts are discouraged from identifying 
themselves as Christian—“It is unnecessary to change your label, because there are issues of community 
and identity.” In addition, the evangelical leadership is keen to obscure their numerical position: “The 
vast part of the evangelical church decided that we would much rather they [Christian converts] actually 
put their birth religion than their new faith [for the purposes of census enumeration]” (Evangelical 
Church, Southern). This, together with the fact that many pastors “would very rarely talk about 
quantitative issues—I would not talk about statistics very easily … you can't gauge, it's very, very 
difficult to gauge [the size of the church]” (Evangelical Church, Southern), highlights the shortcomings of 
quantitative approaches to religious economy theorization in countries like Sri Lanka. 
 
Finally, it is often the laity (rather than evangelical clergy) who use their social influence to expand the 
church. This process has long been recognized and is captured by Lofland and Stark's (1965:871) maxim 
that “conversion [i]s coming to accept the opinions of one's friends.” Notwithstanding, an appreciation of 
the role of the laity as a tool of religious concealment, and not just persuasiveness, is currently lacking. 
Mobilizing the laity to evangelize through their social networks and within their social sphere of influence 
enables Christianity to spread from the inside out: “You will never be able to break in from the outside; 
that's impossible” (Evangelical Church, Southern). One pastor explained his motivations for mobilizing 
and deploying the laity in detail: 
 
I will not go and tell the people about Jesus Christ, because people know that I am a pastor, a 
priest. So they always think this fellow is spreading the gospel; I am very quiet, I am not doing 
anything … But I am teaching the people, the people are doing it [evangelism], and when the 
people are doing it, that means less problem[s]. (Evangelical Church, Southern) 
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One benefit of using members to proselyte is that it draws attention away from the pastor, who would 
easily be exposed if he were found “spreading the gospel.” The value of the clergy being “very quiet” is 
that suspicion is averted and conflict avoided. Indeed, for a pastor to approach non-Christians openly 
would both entrench anti-Christian sentiment and waste time and resources on developing relationships 
that the laity has already formed, given that “it is their village, their friends, their relatives” (Evangelical 
Church, Southern). Moreover, anyone who is new, or different, is often construed in negative terms as a 
source of destabilization that threatens the prevailing structure of society: “Every newcomer is a suspect; 
you have to prove yourself over many years” (Evangelical Church, Southern). The laity creates a 
multiplier effect, whereby the influence and teachings of one pastor diffuse into the community through 
preexisting relationships and channels of communication. Evangelical organizations operating in Sri 
Lanka therefore remain competitive because they eschew the trappings of religious identification; 
symbols of expected religiosity are sacrificed for competitive advantage. 
 
C. Strategic Extra-Group Networks of Influence 
One of the most unique and enduring characteristics of the evangelical movement is the importance of 
internal and external networks of support and influence. Such networks provide individual churches with 
a web from which resources, contacts, and ideas can be extracted, at the same time enabling them to 
retain the autonomy needed to quickly respond to growth opportunities as they arise. Congregations are 
often encouraged to evangelize within their social spheres of influence, the aim being to bring their 
immediate family, friends, and colleagues into the Christian fold. Beyond conversion, extra-group 
networks are developed in order to “tie the Pentecostal infrastructure to the overall structure of the 
established social system within which Pentecostalism exists, and help the Pentecostals to deal with the 
systems to their advantage” (Gerlach and Hine 1968:28). The competitive nature of oligopolistic 
economies makes such networks all the more important, as they are “need[ed] to mobilize other resources 
[in order] to succeed in the marketplace” (Yang 2010:201). Given the marginal position of evangelical 
groups in Sri Lanka, extra-group networks are typically harder to form, more selective, and more 
opportunistic in outcome. They are also often high-risk, involving strategic collaborations based on 
mutual gain. If successful, such networks accelerate the consolidation of minority groups within the 
formal sociorreligious structure. The following three examples illustrate the point. 
 
First, in Colombo an evangelical church wanted to enlarge its premises. To do so, government permission 
was needed, something that, as previously mentioned, is notoriously difficult to obtain through official 
channels. To overcome this problem, the leader of the church told me how he co-opted local MPs 
(Members of Parliament) with the promise of electoral votes: “We will choose some MPs, ministers, to 
invite to our church. … [We say] we will give you our votes, because 600 votes is here; if you win, you 
will help us.” Identifying an opportunity to develop a relationship with political leaders based on mutual 
gain—“we use that weak point”—the church is able to exert influence, gain strategic support, and in 
doing so, overcome a significant barrier to physical expansion. 
 
The transactional nature of such networks is also evident in the second example, which shows how small 
but strategically distributed gifts are used to influence non-Christians. In the south of the island, which is 
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almost homogenously Buddhist and a stronghold of anti-Christian violence, churches have become adept 
at winning the approval of key political personnel with little gifts: 
 
Giving small, small things. With small things we can do great things. You know in the village, 
you have the … chief. In the village, he is the man always reporting to the GA's [government 
agent; the local government representative] office. So sometimes he is against [the church], but 
for small thing we can get the help from him, giving a small present: a pen, calendar, a diary. 
With that you can turn these people. (Evangelical Church, Southern) 
 
The strategic element of the network is contingent upon the ability to “turn these people,” even those that 
are originally against the church. In turn, this provides churches with more leeway when it comes to 
evangelism. 
 
Finally, in the north of the island, a Christian NGO (nongovernmental organization) wanted to gain access 
to a refugee camp to distribute aid to the inhabitants. To gain government permission, the manager of the 
NGO continuously networked with key military and government personnel in the area: “We have to keep 
the network strong and the correct way; if we do the wrong way … everything [is] going to close.” To 
establish a network “the correct way,” the NGO purposely remained silent about the work it does with 
evangelical churches in the area, thus offering non-NGO personnel a blinkered view of the scale of their 
unwitting involvement with evangelical churches. 
 
All three examples show how networks bridge the gap between the informal religious economy and more 
formalized structures of power. Risk and trust are integral to such strategic collaborations, creating an 
uneasy tension between formal acceptance and the concealing cloak of informality. Examples of networks 
like these are not common, which testifies to the difficulties evangelical groups often face when 
establishing them. Strong intragroup networks, however, mean that extra-group networks often provide 
knock-on secondary benefits for smaller, less influential organizations. Thus, while strategic extra-group 
collaborations can help generate specific competitive outcomes at the microscale, at the macroscale the 
volume and strength of intragroups networks that connect organizations around the island means that the 
benefits of such collaborations are often shared, and overall evangelical competitiveness enhanced. 
 
D. Outcomes of the Relational Model of Competitiveness 
The preceding three subsections explored how evangelical groups develop competitive advantages in 
relation to the restrictions imposed on them. This subsection examines how Buddhist groups respond to 
such ongoing forms of competitiveness. I posit that relational forms of competition beget relational forms 
of regulation, and that regulating the informal economy becomes the prerogative of civil society, rather 
than the state. This response to competition involves an expansion of regulation, from formal (i.e., top-
down, state-led, legal) patterns of control to more informal (i.e., bottom-up, violent, reactive) patterns of 
persecution. As the state loses regulatory control over the informal economy, civil society plays an 
increasingly important role in defending the “interests” of the oligopoly, creating a situation where the 
popular view is that although “the Constitution is good for Parliament, the common man rules here” 
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(Evangelical Church, Southern). Thus, while the competitive actions of evangelical groups erode the 
numerical dominance of Buddhism, they simultaneously foster an increasingly punitive form of Buddhist 
hegemony, one that is grounded in the competitive desire of both majority and minority players to 
“overcome, eliminate, or convert the other to extinction” (Bouma 2007:190; see also Gramsci 1973). 
Whereas Grim and Finke (2011) argue that the restriction of religious freedom by the state results in 
violent forms of persecution, I believe that the competitive actions of minority groups strengthen the 
persecution meted out against them. In this sense regulation, competition, and conflict should not be seen 
in unitary terms as the actions of one group against another, but as outcomes of dynamic processes of 
interaction, a dynamic best described by a relational rather than normative model. 
 
For example, the competitive value of the house church has to be tempered in relation to the more 
informal types of resistance perpetrated against evangelicals because of it. Somewhat ironically, it is the 
inability of the legislative system to effectively regulate house churches that has led to more bottom-up 
forms of persecution. A representative of a Buddhist organization told me that the “sheds and all that of 
the evangelicals” are believed to “invite natural attacks”; people “get organized and threaten them [the 
house churches], attack them, or set fire to these places” (Buddhist Organization, Western) because it is 
believed to be the most effective way of suppressing their growth. The U.S. Department of State (2010) 
provides a number of detailed accounts of attacks—often involving mobs of people led by Buddhist 
monks—perpetrated against evangelical churches or the homes of evangelical pastors, and supports the 
observation that “all the small churches, they are crushed, persecuted” (Evangelical Church, Western). 
Such antagonism is legitimized on the grounds that Buddhists “found they can't rely on the established 
system, because the established system is with the powerful side, not with the weaker side” (Buddhist 
Organization, Western). Evangelical groups are paradoxically portrayed here as the “powerful side” and 
Buddhism as the “weaker side,” reflecting a reversal of their actual positions that is driven by postcolonial 
discourses depicting Christianity as a religion at the “frontiers of [Western] hegemony” (Pieterse 1992:13; 
Wallace 2006). 
 
Assertions like these are hardly surprising, especially given that such violent forms of retaliation do, in 
some respects, reify the idea outlined above of a transcendental Christian order. It is not without irony 
that, despite expansive efforts to inculturate Christianity—“You must present Christ in a manner they 
understand; we give the same gospel [but] with a different coating” (Evangelical Church, Western)—
strategies of inculturation are selective and not all encompassing. The very fact that most evangelical 
groups ignore the culturally accepted norms of religious dress and places of worship reflects a self-
imposed mantle of “foreignness” or cultural dislocation. While this tactic enables them to remain 
competitive, it also provides a source of justification by anti-Christians for more virulent attempts to keep 
competitiveness in check: “All kinds of misbehavior is looked at as [Buddhist] heroism, so they keep 
doing it because nobody is there telling them [not to]; neither the President, or the politicians, or the 
police” (Evangelical Church, Western). In this we see the power of civil society to dictate the limits of 
religious freedom. Such outcomes and the problems associated with them call into question the 
sustainability of the relational model of competitiveness, and the actors engaged therein. 
 
In terms of sustainability, recognized mainline churches stand in contrast to the entirely footloose nature 
of their evangelical counterparts. One mainline pastor evoked a useful metaphor when stating that “we 
have to run on the track that is given to us; we cannot run across here and there” (Mainline Church, 
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Western). Thus, while mainline churches must compete according to the parameters defined by the formal 
religious economy (“the track”), evangelical groups “run across here and there” in order to make the most 
of opportunities that arise outside of such (seemingly restrictive) regulatory parameters. A lack of 
accountability means “there is no control” (Evangelical Church, Central), and this fuels widespread 
accusations—from Christians and non-Christians alike—that “all those people have vested interests, all of 
the evangelicals; they want to be leaders … they want the money” (Evangelical Parachurch, Western). 
One of the biggest pitfalls of a relational, competition-driven religious economy is that religious goals can 
easily become conflated with personal ambition, leading to the above-mentioned “vested interests.” 
Churches split; the marketplace becomes saturated, impelling pastors, proselyting in order to sustain 
themselves, to become increasingly aggressive, perhaps at times belligerent, and therefore overt; and 
persecution ensues, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of competition, resistance, and conflict. 
 
Conclusions 
Alongside the work of Yang (2006, 2007, 2010), this article reflects a nascent shift in religious economy 
theorizing toward addressing informality. It also is in line with Woodhead's (2009:113) “emerging” 
paradigm in the sociological study of religion, which is defined by relationality and a concomitant focus 
on “the actual configurations of political and economic power in contemporary society, and how they 
impact on religion.” By exploring the motivations and methods of competitiveness employed by 
evangelical groups operating in Sri Lanka, I have shown that there exists a recursive relationship between 
Buddhist power and Christian resilience. Persecution serves to “embolden the actions of social, political, 
and religious groups that learn how to work within the system” (Grim and Finke 2007:637). Yet I suggest 
that rather than working “within the system,” minority groups create their own parallel systems, which, in 
this case, is the informal religious economy. It is by exploring how the formal and informal religious 
economies are mutually distinct, yet intersect and develop in relation to each other, that this article 
diverges from Yang's work on religious oligopoly. Moreover, beyond establishing a point of conceptual 
reference for ongoing theorization of the informal religious economy, the study has generated three 
insights in particular that provide a useful starting point for further inquiry. 
 
First, risk (and to a lesser extent, trust) is a central determinant of competitive gain in an informal 
religious economy. In this regard, the relationship between religion and risk is woefully undertheorized. 
In terms of the strategic extra-group networks of influence, more work can be done to ascertain how risk 
is managed and mitigated, how trust is obtained and betrayed, and the ensuing effects on organizational 
competitiveness. In addition, converting into an informal religious economy is a high-risk activity, not 
least in Sri Lanka where the dominance of the sociocultural context imposes a degree of religious 
immobility on individuals. I have shown how evangelical pastors discourage converts from changing their 
“label,” although the risks associated with being an undercover Christian (in terms of backsliding and 
betrayal) require further exploration. Doing so will help inculturate the discourse, as well as overcome the 
obvious de-culturated limitations of economic theorizing. 
 
Second, normative models treat religious economies as isolated systems of analysis, and often fail to 
situate them within international systems of religious power and influence. Religious economies are often 
as globalized as secular economies—a truism that existing theorizations have failed to recognize or 
embrace. Thankfully, the geopolitical horizon of the emerging paradigm is one that traverses scales—
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from the local to the national and international (and, I would argue, transcendental)—and should, 
therefore, discourage the myopia that has long stifled the development of more encompassing 
theorizations. Dislodging the theorization of religious systems from the safe confines of clearly bounded 
analysis will help realize a more universally applicable, and critically engaged, understanding of religious 
change that cuts across geographies, religious traditions, and the systems of power inherent to each. 
 
Finally, religious economy theorists have for too long privileged quantitative over qualitative 
methodologies when drawing conclusions about the workings of a religious economy. Quantitative 
models help explain religious change at the macrolevel, yet in doing so they risk overlooking market 
nuances at the microlevel. As Yang (2006:94; see also Wuthnow 2011) puts it: “Researchers should not 
forget that some factors might be more difficult to quantify, but nonetheless play critical roles.” The 
methodological impotence of large-scale datasets for understanding informal religious contexts, like that 
of Sri Lanka, provides compelling support for the value of first-hand observations and in-depth 
conversations with the key players. Without such inductive checks, the practices of religious groups 
operating informally, or illegally, will remain undetected, and a remarkable wealth of evidence and 
insight unmined. 
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